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Sociological models have been extensively used to predict the behavior of 
terrorist groups and to understand their use of terrorism.  Much remains to be 
understood, however, concerning the factors that govern the growth or decline of 
these groups.  Sociological models are inadequate for understanding terrorist 
behavior because these models typically do not account for the behavior of 
individuals who ignore social mores.  This thesis explores the use of biological 
population models as a means to incorporate predator-prey behavior factors into 
terrorist models.  This thesis also demonstrates that this method is more 
appropriate for examining the growth and decline of terrorist organizations 
through the interaction of law enforcement and terrorist recruitment efforts.  After 
analyzing the respective strengths and weaknesses of sociological and biological 
models, the thesis applies a biological model, the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey 
model, to a highly suggestive case study, that of the Irish Republican Army.  This 
case study illuminates how a biological model can be utilized to understand the 
actions of a terrorist organization, and offer predictive value that sociological 
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One of the primary missions in the war against terrorism is to investigate 
and analyze the participants, actions, and funding mechanisms of terrorist 
organizations.  It allows analysts to identify and interpret clues that an impending 
terrorist act is going to occur.  It also guides the development of policies, which 
will hopefully prevent terrorists from obtaining their goals.  Unfortunately, 
examination of the literature has proven that analysts are not utilizing the most 
appropriate models to assess the behavior of terrorist organizations.  The 
analysts are working with models which were developed to understand non-
violent organizations.  These models do not take into account behavior of a 
group of individuals who have no regard for social mores.     
Considering the significance of obtaining accurate analyses, it is important 
to utilize models which do not require its subjects to have morals or non-violent 
behavior.  One unrecognized source of models is the models used to describe 
the interactions between biological populations.  These models were developed 
to incorporate competition between species and individuals, as well as fighting 
and organized warfare between species.  The output is utilized to determine 
which population will succeed in a competition over resources and shared 
habitats.  The data analysis is used to predict which individual in a population is 
most virulent.  They expect populations to die off and to be replaced by others.  
Biological models are more accurate in analyzing terrorist organizations than any 
other method utilized thus far.  This thesis will demonstrate how one particular 
biological model, the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, is more accurate in 
analyzing the recruitment of a terrorist organization, the Irish Republican Army, 
than any sociological model.   
There are models available, especially those used to study violent gangs, 
which expect violent behavior from its study subjects.  Gangs and terrorist groups 
are very different in their organizational structure.  The social disorganization 
theory, which is used to study gangs, is not appropriate to study terrorist groups.  
2 
The individuals who study gangs are also utilizing models which were originally 
developed to understand non-violent behavior, with the violent behavior built into 
the model as it suited the behavior of the organization.  The biological models 
were built initially with the violent actions expected of the subjects and therefore 
violent interactions between the study populations were originally incorporated 
into the behavior of the model.  For these reasons, biological models will provide 
a more rigorous analysis of the behaviors seen in terrorist organizations than the 
models used to examine gangs.     
By providing a new source of models for studying terrorism, the dynamics 
of a terrorist group can be better understood and provide insights towards how a 
government’s policies might impact different terrorist organizations.  This may 
eventually lead to the development of more accurate models and predictions, as 
well as eventually developing appropriate policies to halt terrorism.    
The first chapter of this thesis will explain the rational of choosing a 
biological model instead of a sociological one.  The second chapter introduces 
the prey and predator populations.  The prey population is the terrorist 
organization or, in the case of this thesis, the Irish Republican Army; the 
adversary, or the predator population, is the British Army.  Considering the 
secretive nature of terrorist organizations, the population numbers of the Irish 
Republican Army are unknown; therefore, the populous support of the political 
arm of the Irish Republican Army, Sinn Féin, is used instead.  The last chapter of 
the thesis introduces the model, the procedures taken to develop the model, and 
confirms that the biological Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model is an appropriate 
model to describe the recruitment of a terrorist organization.    
3 
II. MODELING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter will explain why it is important to model terrorist 
organizations.  It will provide examples of what types of models currently exist 
and a description of the traits that make a group of individuals a terrorist 
organization, as well as explaining why they are different from gangs (the closest 
social organization to terrorist organizations).  This thesis also examines why 
models used to study gangs are not appropriate to help study terrorist 
organizations.  Finally, there will be a discussion explaining why a biological 
model was selected as an alternative.   
 
A. IMPORTANCE OF MODELING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Understanding the behavior of terrorist organizations can help determine if 
current policies for combating terrorism are effective and aid in the development 
of more suitable policies.  Not many groups examine the behavior of terrorist 
organizations.  The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) performed a 
literature search looking for individuals performing “computer modeling and 
simulation research related specifically to the dynamics of terrorist cells,” i.e., the 
interaction between individuals.1  They found that there were “virtually no 
computational models dealing specifically with the behavior of terrorist cells in 
any rigorous manner.”2  The models that exist are either too generic in scope (for 
example, dealing with groups of unspecified size) or use agents in a different 
domain (for example, pilots in a flight or soldiers in a troop).3  Therefore, CNS 
expanded their research to identify any available resources focusing on terrorist 
cells; the result was that there are very few resources available.4    
                                            
1 Gary Ackerman, Literature Review of Modeling of the Behavior of Terrorist Cells, 
(California: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002), 2. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.    
4 Ibid.  
4 
Currently, the analysis of terrorist organizations is performed by the multi-
agency National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Department of 
Homeland Security: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate.  NCTC works to “analyze terrorist threat related information, 
expertise, and capabilities to conduct threat analysis.”5  It is their mission to 
“create new knowledge from existing information.”6   
An analytical approach for studying terrorism is important because it will 
help those involved in the War on Terrorism understand the behavior of terrorist 
organizations, determine the causes of their non-traditional manner, and predict 
what may occur in the future, provided particular intelligence is available.  
Furthermore, it will assist policy makers in identifying strategies to prevent 
terrorist organizations from meeting their objectives.   
 
B. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
As defined by Martha Crenshaw, “terrorism is deliberate and systematic 
violence performed by small numbers of people…the purpose of (which) is to 
intimidate a watching popular audience by harming only a few…(it) is political 
and symbolic, … [and] a clandestine resistance to authority.”7  Terrorism can be 
viewed as a collection of individuals whose goal is to perform harassing, 
disruptive, and destructive activities as a clandestine, stateless, mobile, and 
                                            
5 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America,” 
President George Bush, The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-12.html [Accessed 10 June 
2004]. 
6 J Brennan, “Written Statement for the Record of John O. Brennan Director, Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center on Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community before the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Washington D.C., April 14, 2004,”  
Central Intelligence Agency, 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/brennan_testimony_04142004.html 
[Accessed 5 June 2004].   
7 Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, “Interpreting and Responding to 
Terrorism” Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, 
http://www.webster.edu/peacepsychology/terrorismstatement.html [Accessed 11 November 
2005]. 
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opportunistic network of committed groups.8  These networks are the most 
survivable organizational form of terrorism; and they are not fully understood by 
researches of terrorism.  Their knowledge base is focused more specifically on 
recognized organizations, such as corporations, hospitals, universities, civil 
service bureaucracies, voluntary organizations, and organizations developed to 
direct the activities of social movements.  In contrast, there are only some, 
primarily indirect, insights about terrorist organizations in the literature.9 
Not many published studies examining the behavior of terrorist 
organizations exist; however, in those that do, there are thorough analyses of the 
behavior of terrorist organizations and of the individuals who belong to these 
organizations.  In its basic form, terrorist organizations are considered to be just 
another type of organization, like a key club, or a screen actor’s guild.  In a 
September 1999 report entitled The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: 
Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, author Rex A. Hudson writes “Acts of 
terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on 
commonly held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to the group 
and its beliefs varies.”10  The difference lies in how the terrorists attempt to reach 
their goals; instead of helping their neighbors, they use unexpected, shocking, 
unlawful and calculated violence against noncombatants (e.g., civilians, off-duty 
military, and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets 
for the “psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or 
intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting 
demands on behalf of the cause.”11  Significant differences when comparing 
terrorist to other organizations may be summed up in the following: 
                                            
8 Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell, ed., Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11, 
(District of Columbia: National Academy of Press, 2002), 
http://darwin.nap.edu/books/0309085306/html/ [Accessed 11 Nov 2005], 26. 
9 Ibid., 22. 
10 Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 34.  
11 Ibid., 12. 
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• Terrorist groups compared to known organizations (religious sects 
or cults):   
• Total commitment is required of their members. 
• Relations with outsiders are usually prohibited. 
• Sexual relations are regulated and sometimes banned. 
• The leaders of the organization impose conformity. 
• The leaders of the organization seek cohesiveness through 
interdependence and mutual trust. 
• The leaders of the organization attempt to convince individual 
members to believe in their particular ideology.12   
• Terrorist groups are “typically far-flung networks that rely on 
secrecy, invisibility, flexibility, extreme commitment on the part of 
their members, and coordination of military-like activities.”13   
• Terrorism thrives on secrecy and surprise.   
• “While terrorists operate within certain kinds of constraint on 
their actions, a condition of their success is to strike with 
surprise on often unanticipated targets, to rule no target out 
altogether, and to capitalize on ambiguity and uncertainty rather 
than defined understandings.”14   
• They will not communicate with their adversaries.15 
• They will work to ensure that their enemy does not know about 
their whereabouts or intentions.  This information will 
compromise their foundation of secrecy, ultimately undermining 
their purpose.16   
• Terrorist organizations, even though they are located within states 
are considered stateless, are not responsible for governing and 
defending national integrity, and are not directly influenced by 
threats to a nation.17  
 
 
                                            
12 Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 35. 
13 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 2. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 13. 
7 
Furthermore, consider this principle of group dynamics: 
One generally accepted principle, as demonstrated by W. Bion (in a 
1961 publication), is that individual judgment and behavior are 
strongly influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics.  
Every group according to Bion, has two opposing forces - a rare 
tendency to act in a fully cooperative, goal-directed, conflict-free 
manner to accomplish its stated purposes, and a stronger tendency 
to sabotage the stated goals.  The latter tendency results in a group 
that defines itself in relation to the outside world and acts as if the 
only way it can survive is by fighting against or fleeing from the 
perceived enemy; a group that looks for direction to an omnipotent 
leader, to whom they subordinate their own independent judgment 
and act as if they do not have minds of their own; and a group that 
acts as if the group will bring forth a messiah who will rescue them 
and create a better world.18    
Terrorist groups attract many individuals because they provide “a sense of 
belonging, a feeling of self-importance, and a new belief system that defines the 
terrorist act as morally acceptable and the group’s goals as of paramount 
importance.”19  Martha Crenshaw identified permissive factors that make these 
organizations attractive, particularly to political dissidents, and aid in the 
development of terrorist strategies, consequently motivating terrorists.  “These 
factors are urbanization, transportation system, communications media, weapons 
availability, and absence of security measures.”20  Studies of those countries with 
multiple terrorist organizations indicate that many of the people who join terrorist 
organizations are impacted by demographic and economic disadvantages.  
These countries have the highest fertility rates in the world, leading to rapid 
growth of the populations; these large populations place harsh economic 
demands on the states and create an age distribution where there are many 
young and a few old.  The large youth populations stresses the education system 
and results in a high proportion of youth who are unable to find a productive 
economic role.  This causes high unemployment, a competitive employment 
                                            
18 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 9. 
19 Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 34.  
20 Ibid., 16. 
8 
market for marginal jobs, a pressure to emigrate, and frequently large-scale 
social marginalization.  All of this feeds into a high level of social and political 
dissatisfaction; as in the case of Muslim countries, “when this dissatisfaction is 
given meaning in the context of anti-Western and radical Muslim ideologies, a 
fertile breeding ground for terrorist recruits is at hand.”21  
There are many different types of terrorist groups: nationalist-separatist, 
religious fundamentalist, new religious, and social revolutionary or idealist.22  
Each type of terrorist organization, e.g., religious, political, environmental, has its 
own culture.  “If religious commitment is part of the picture, they are likely to 
regard themselves as moral actors, doing violence to others and even to 
themselves for good and sufficient reasons.”23  Known terrorist organizations are 
assigned a “type” based on their political background or ideology;24 the 
counterterrorist policies utilized to counteract the terrorist organization are usually 
chosen based on the typology of the group.  For example, a government will 
develop one policy to deal with a terrorist group that is fighting for religious 
freedom and a different policy to counteract the organizations fighting for 
environmental rights.  Subsequently, the means of analysis to determine 
population dynamics proposed in this thesis does not depend on the type of 
organization it is.   
Author Neil Smelser writes, “Terrorism is a strategy of the weak against 
the strong.”25  Due to the commitment of its members to an extreme ideology, 
terrorist leaders face internal issues not encountered by benevolent 
organizations.  Terrorist leaders need to recruit individuals whom they “regard as 
ideologically committed and ideologically correct.  They must dedicate some of 
their organizational activities to maintaining that loyalty and commitment and 
                                            
21 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 39-30. 
22 Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 15. 
23 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 13.   
24 Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism, 15. 
25 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 29. 
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preventing backsliding among members who are frequently living in societies 
with values, ways of life, and institutions that are different from their own and may 
be found seductive.”26  They maintain discipline through intense personal ties, 
hierarchical control, and surveillance.27  Terrorists may even know that their 
enemy can destroy them, but if they believe their enemy cannot quickly retaliate 
against their actions, they may proceed anyway.28  Terrorists have one trait in 
common by living in the future, they are constantly looking for that “distant-yet 
imperceptibly close-point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their 
enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their political destiny.”29   
 
C. CURRENT MODELING EFFORTS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
For an organization to survive, it needs to have a defined social and 
political structure: leadership, membership, a funding base, goals, and a mission.  
Even though organizations have unique structures, social theorists concluded 
that there are some commonalities among them.  These similarities have allowed 
social scientists to develop theories of social behavior, i.e., the driving forces 
which allow an organization to survive and meet its goals.   
The world has experienced many other kinds of secret, network-
based organizations, and a base of knowledge about them and 
their operations has accumulated.  Among these organizations are 
spy networks, gang rings such as the Mafia, drug-trafficking 
organizations, Communist cells, sabotage operations undertaken 
during wartime and during the cold war period, and extremist social 
and political movement organizations.  In addition, network analysis 
as a field of study in sociology, social psychology, and elsewhere 
has yielded a great deal of theoretical and empirical knowledge 
during recent decades.30  
                                            
26 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 13. 
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 Ibid., and Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Columbia University Press, 1998), 
169. 
30 Smelzer and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 24. 
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There are two types of models commonly used to examine the dynamics of 
terrorist organizations: social network analysis (SNA) models and small-group 
dynamic models.  The reasons why these models are not appropriate for 
understanding terrorist organizations are explained below.   
Social theorists utilize social network analysis models to understand 
human group dynamics; specifically, they have attempted to use these models to 
describe the behavioral structure of terrorist organizations.31  However, these 
models are typically used to describe organizations that have stable social 
structures and engage in non-terrorist activities, e.g., helping neighbors, cleaning 
beaches, and raising money for cancer research.  Terrorist organizations do not 
follow the normal group dynamics motivated by philanthropy and generosity that 
one would find at a fire department or Rotary club.  Their organizational behavior 
is driven more by a need to survive and ensure that their enemies do not survive.  
These differences are significant enough to expect that there is a better method 
available to predict the actions of terrorist organizations.   
Due to the secretive nature of terrorist organizations, researchers have 
had difficulties in understanding terrorist group dynamics.  As a result, social 
scientists instead have utilized their knowledge of small-group dynamics to aid in 
the understanding of terrorist group dynamics.32  However, as with SNA, utilizing 
models meant for small-groups are also not the most appropriate method to help 
understand terrorist organizations, for they are only appropriate when the 
organization divides itself into small groups.   
 
D. GANGS VERSUS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Sociologists who analyze terrorist organizations have looked for help from 
the studies performed on gangs; this is because, in comparison, gangs have the 
most similar social organization.  Historically, sociologists depended on social 
                                            
31 Ackerman, Literature Review of Modeling of the Behavior of Terrorist Cells, 2.    
32 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist 
and Why?, (District of Columbia:  Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1999), 34.   
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf  [Accessed 12 November 2005],  
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disorganization theory to develop models to understand gang behavior.  Social 
disorganization theory describes the “failure of social institutions or social 
organizations…in certain communities and or neighborhoods.”33  This theory was 
developed by scientists trying to understand the relationship between an 
organism and its environment.34  In addition, sociologists utilize the same types 
of models for terrorist organizations as gangs because of the availability of 
information about gangs.    
Gangs are groups which “exist for or benefits substantially from the 
continuing criminal activity of its members.”35  A comprehensive study of gangs 
identified commonalities among individuals.  The individuals are more likely to 
have a “super predator” personality trait with the following characteristics:  
• They are the bullies in school who do not avoid situations where 
they may get hurt.  
• Not likely to attend church or believe in God; they believe they are 
doing Satan’s work.    
• Often raised in a single-mother household, they perceive that they 
are members of the underclass; they conceal their gang 
involvement from their parent(s) because most feel that their 
parent(s) would be embarrassed if they knew their child was in a 
gang.  
• They usually sell cocaine and are involved in drug dealing.  
• They have minimal educational credentials.  
• They have fired upon police officers and have served time in prison. 
• They admit that they commit crime for their own individual benefit 
and not for the gang.36 
                                            
33 Thomas O’Connor, “Social Disorganization Theories of Crime,” North Carolina Wesleyan 
College,  http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/301/301lect08.htm [Accessed 10 November 2005]. 
34 Ibid.  
35 National Gang Crime Research Center, “Bomb and Arson Crimes Among American Gang 
Members: A Behavioral Science Profile,” National Gang Crime Research Center.  
http://www.ngcrc.com/bombarso.html [Accessed 12 November 2005].   
36 National Gang Crime Research Center,“The Facts About Gang Life In American Today: A 
National Study of Over 4,000 Gang Members,” National Gang Crime Research Center, 
http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/page9.htm [Accessed 12 November 2005].  
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When a Chicago gang member, Jose Padilla, was in prison as a 
suspected al-Qaeda operative, scientists recognized a connection between gang 
behavior and the behavior of terrorists.  National Gang Crime Research Center 
(NGRC) requested a review for both the public and the police of the material that 
identifies commonalities between gangs and terrorists.37  One report compared 
gang members who committed arson and bomb crimes to those who did not; it 
indicated that, in many situations, gang members were considered urban 
terrorists, urban guerilla fighters, revolutionary fighters, or rebel fighters.38  
Because of these similarities, researchers feel that it is appropriate to use the 
same models for the analysis of terrorist organizations as those developed for 
the research of gangs.39  
However, the differences between gang and terrorist organizations are 
significant enough to consider other types of models to describe the behavior of 
terrorist organizations.  “Terrorism…involves committing acts of violence to gain 
its ends, however tenuous and remote the hope that the attacked nation will 
comply with its demands.”40  While many gangs have local, regional, or statewide 
influence, they do not have the nation or world-wide effects of terrorist 
organizations.  Terrorist organizations consider whole governments, including 
military, law enforcement, and legislatures, as their enemy, unlike gangs whose 
primary enemies are law enforcement and other local gangs.  Furthermore, 
terrorists are not easily identified; they work in secrecy and form sleeper cells (go 
into hiding) if their enemy – the government their actions are focused on – knows 
too much about their activities.  Finally, their goal is to ensure the survival of their 
cause, no matter what the cost.  “The characteristics of terrorist organizations 
can be understood by tracing out the implications of the fact that terrorism must 
                                            
37 National Gang Crime Research Center, “Gangs and Terrorism,” National Gang Research 
Center, http://www.ngcrc.com/terrorism.html [Accessed 12 November 2005].  
38 National Gang Crime Research Center, “Bomb and Arson Crimes Among American Gang 
Members.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 9. 
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be simultaneously invisible and at the same time coordinated for preparing and 
executing terrorist activities.  Consistent with these purposes, terrorist 
organizations must maintain extreme secrecy, avoid record keeping, and 
minimize any paper trails that could reveal their internal movements, plans, and 
intentions.”41   
Sociologists should consider models other than the ones currently used 
for gang research to help understand terrorist organizations.  As described 
above, there are significant differences between the nature of gangs and terrorist 
organizations.  These differences alone are enough to explain why the models 
that are appropriate for gangs are not appropriate for terrorist organizations.  
However, there is another valid reason, the gang models described above 
introduce violent behavior into models which were originally used to describe 
non-violent interactions.  Therefore, the models used to understand the violent 
behavior between gangs might not be rigorous enough to completely describe 
the interactions between different gangs.  It would be more appropriate to obtain 
models which were initially developed with violent interactions among its subjects 
to help understand terrorist organizations than to chose models which were 
adapted to incorporate violent behavior.  
 
E. WHY USE BIOLOGICAL MODELS TO PREDICT THE BEHAVIOR OF 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS? 
A review of the current literature on terrorist organizations demonstrates 
that the models currently used are not providing very accurate predictions or 
analyses of the behavior of terrorist organizations.  For this reason, other types of 
models were explored and during this investigation, the similarities among 
terrorist organizations and wildlife populations became evident.   
As described by Charles Darwin in his Theory of Natural Selection, wildlife 
populations survive because they are “fit” enough to pass their genes onto their 
                                            
41 Smelser and Mitchell, Discouraging Terrorism, 22. 
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young.  Wildlife fitness is a “measure of the selective quality of genes”42 or their 
ability to reproduce.  Populations which are better “fit” than others will have a 
better chance of their genes surviving in the future.  Fitness is dependant on 
feeding behavior, eating the correct food, and knowing where, when, and how to 
search for food.  It is also dependant on their sexual behavior, choosing the 
appropriate mating strategy (monogamy or polygamy), and finding the 
appropriate mate.  Finally, fitness is dependant on territorial behavior; choosing 
an appropriate location and size for their territory, and the appropriate defensive 
strategy.43  In a similar way, terrorist organizations also have a specific strategy 
to increase their own “fitness.”  This initial similarity was sufficiently strong 
enough to consider models used to describe wildlife populations for analyzing 
terrorist organizations.   
Competition between individuals and species are inherent in the models 
used by ecologists and behaviorists.  For example, models have examined how 
successful weapons are in defending one species against their enemy;44 
estimated the time when one species will successfully kill off another;45 
determined which species will have control over the local habitat;46 and verified 
which individual in a group will dominate over the others.47  Considering 
biological models already incorporate dynamics similar to those that exist  
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Ecology,”,” Eastern Kentucky University, http://people.eku.edu/ritchisong/behavecolnotes.htm 
[Accessed 18 February 2006]. 
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Prey,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 218 (2002): 55–70.    
45 A. De Koeijer, et al.  “Modeling the spread of phocine distemper virus among harbor 
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46 Michael Hudson and Thomas Smith, “Plant Succession: Life History and Competition,” 
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between terrorist organizations and their victims, it solidified the decision that 
biological models are appropriate to help understand the dynamics of terrorist 
organizations.   
For years, biologists have used models to examine community dynamics:  
social structure, selection of habitats and mates, relationships with prey, time of 
food consumption, and recruitment.  Wildlife managers, facing the extinction of 
many different species, have used other models to predict trends, e.g., how a 
population disperses into a new habitat, or understanding the factors which 
influence or hinder the population growth, recruitment, and competition within a 
population.  Wildlife managers make predictions knowing the current 
environment and what factors influence the population size of a species; they use 
these predictions to determine the type of management required to reestablish a 
species, particularly common in recovery plans.  Population dynamics are used 
to develop the model and then the model is used to understand the outside 
influences on the population.  Some of these models have been developed to 
describe a particular population, whereas more advanced models allow for 
changes throughout time.  
Population models are used to describe population dynamics, predict 
population sizes, and aid in population management, especially those species 
which are in jeopardy of going extinct.  Yet, most of these modeling activities 
concentrate on wildlife populations, i.e., moose, wolves, ladybugs, and 
grasshoppers.  These are species which are believed to be driven by instincts of 
survival alone without the influences of the humanesque thought process.  This 
activity has helped prevent higher-order animals from extinction, e.g., the gray 
wolf, West Indian manatee, and the Florida panther.  In addition, they are used to 
examine interactions among species.   
Just as biologists have developed models that predict population trends in 
wildlife populations, this paper addresses the use of a basic population model, 
Lotka-Volterra (L-V) predator-prey population model, to demonstrate its 
effectiveness in predicting recruitment, i.e., population trends, of a terrorist 
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organization; this thesis will use the Irish Republican Army as an example.  The 
L-V model is used to describe population dynamics, particularly between two 
competing populations.  It is a basic, supply and demand type model, where the 
population of one preys on another, and the size of each population has an 
impact on the size of the other population.  By examining and understanding the 
population dynamics of an organization, one can determine its maturation and its 
phase of the evolution.  For example, is the organization in a recruitment phase?  
Is it losing membership and support?  Is it stable or is it going through significant 
change?  By overlapping the dynamics with current events, the organizations’ 
behavior may be well understood.   
The events which occurred in Ireland during the Thirty Years War are well 
documented.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA), once a very threatening group, 
has been considered less of a threat recently because of a cease-fire agreement 
with the British government that it has had on and off since 1997.  The IRA has 
had tremendous influence on Irish and British politics, economics, and life.  Since 
their cease-fire, the IRA’s actions and recruitment activities have been thoroughly 
analyzed; this is because they are no longer considered to have a great influence 
on the Irish and British public.  These are among the many reasons that makes 
the IRA is a good candidate to analyze with the selected biological model.  While 
the history of the events of the fighting between the British Army and the IRA are 
well documented, it is important to note that much of the organization-level 
politics continue to remain confidential.   
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III. THE CASE STUDY 
A. THE PREDATOR AND THE PREY 
This chapter explains the history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and its political arm, Sinn Féin.  It also describes the dynamics of the IRA’s 
relationship with the British Army.  Understanding these factors provides 
significant insight into the association between the predator and the prey. 
 
B. THE TERRORIST GROUP: THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN 
ARMY  
Uniting the 26 counties of Ireland with the six Ulster counties of Northern 
Ireland was so important to some of the Irish that individuals from both Northern 
Ireland and Ireland fought together to remove British rule.  Even though the fight 
to unite all of Ireland started in the 1920s, it became prevalent in the 1960s.  
Similar to most of the British and French colonies in the 1960s, some of the 
Catholic Irish within Northern Ireland desired to have their own government 
instead of being ruled by the British.  Like other countries which fought for their 
independence from British rule, the members of the IRA hoped they too would 
succeed in unifying Ireland.  Most of their actions were confined to activities 
within the United Kingdom, especially within the Northern Irish territories; 
however, they did venture away from the motherland and performed terrorist acts 
in other continents, including Africa, Europe, and South America as well as the 
United States.   
The IRA utilized terrorist activities against the organizations supporting 
British rule, and those organizations retaliated by performing their own terrorist 
actions.  The Provisional Irish Republican Army48 shot, bombed, and killed British 
soldiers, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Ulster Defence 
Regiment (UDF), protestant civilians, British civilians, and even their own to 
                                            
48 There are four groups calling themselves the Irish Republican Army.  The largest group 
and the one most identified as the IRA is the Provisional IRA (Moloney, Secret History, 566).   
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release the six Ulster counties from British rule.  Because of these harsh actions, 
they were labeled as “terrorists” by the British, Irish and international 
governments.49   
Many organizations fought against the IRA’s terror, including the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the British Army, and the two loyalist paramilitary 
organizations: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)/(UFF) and the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF).  The RUC was the police force of Northern Ireland, but 
the British Army was the main security force in Northern Ireland; they both 
attempted to maintain peace between those who desired to unite all of Ireland 
with those that wanted to keep part of Ireland under British rule.   
In the more than 30 years of fighting within the United Kingdom, police 
forces, military units, and civilians maintained a constant vigil to remain 
unharmed by the activities of the individuals fighting for the government of their 
choice.  A total of 3,523 individuals were killed during the fighting in Northern 
Ireland, 1,111 were British security, 1,857 were civilians, 10 were Irish security, 
151 were Loyalist paramilitary, and 394 were republican paramilitary.50  
Everyone was affected by the violent activities occurring in Northern Ireland.    
The Provisional IRA (PIRA) is a splinter group of the original IRA which 
started in the 1900s.  The members of PIRA felt that the members of the Official 
IRA were putting ideology before nationalism and were no longer fighting for the 
same cause.  Sinn Féin, the Irish republican political organization, supported the 
actions of the PIRA instead of the OIRA in the political arena; they fought 
politically for the same causes as the PIRA, and are now considered the political 
                                            
49 Petrol, nail and car bombs were set outside of public buildings.  Incendiary devices were 
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September 2004]. 
David McKitrick, et al., Lost Lives – The stories of the men, women and children who died as 
a result of the Northern Ireland troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1999), 1493–1511.  
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arm of the PIRA.  As of 2005, the PIRA has been abiding by a ceasefire they 
signed in 1997.  Even though they are no longer active, they are still considered 
by the United States State Department a group of interest because they are still 
able to conduct paramilitary operations.51  Recent events (discussed in Chapter 
3) may change this status.  As part of the ceasefire and the Good Friday 
agreement, the PIRA totally disarmed to allow Sinn Féin to participate in the 
newly formed Northern Ireland Assembly.  During the fall of 2005, the PIRA 
declared they were fully disarmed, thus allowing the particulars detailed in the 
Good Friday Agreement to be implemented.    
Historians recognize the many different organizations that were involved in 
the terrorist and peacemaking activities in Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Britain 
throughout the past three decades.  Nationalists were fighting against the army 
and RUC.  The loyalists (who wanted to remain under British rule) were offended 
that the nationalists wanted to change their British citizenship, and were also 
enraged that their own (RUC, but also army) were being killed as the nationalists 
fought their war.  In response, the loyalists retaliated and killed Catholics; the 
Catholics then became involved, and so on.  In the end, many different groups 
were involved in the fighting.  For the ease of understanding the dynamics 
involved in the Irish conflict, the struggle between the British Army and the IRA 
(the main antagonist groups) is the sole focus of this project. 
 
C. THE POLITICAL PARTY: SINN FÉIN 
Many different political parties played a role in the Thirty Years War.  One 
of the most significant was Sinn Féin, established in 1901 by Arthur Griffith, the 
editor of The United Irishman.  He used his position at the newspaper to support 
home rule by advising Irish members not to take their spots in Parliament, but 
                                            
51 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist 
Groups” in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 Report (District of Columbia: Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004), 139–160. 
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rather to create a National Council in Ireland; this would bring the ruling parties 
from Britain to Ireland.52  This was ineffective, but resulted in the creation of a 
new political party.  After a failed attempt of gathering support for a republican 
military campaign in 1962, Sinn Féin worked to help the working class create a 
coalition.  Sinn Féin promoted abstention until 1969, when the IRA Chief of Staff, 
Cathal Goulding, proposed that Sinn Féin drop its policy of abstention; he 
proposed that Sinn Féin fight the elections in the Dail, Stormont, and United 
Kingdom Parliament in an attempt to win seats.  Goulding formed the Provisional 
IRA with this new policy; utilizing the political arena as a vehicle to inform the 
public about their plight and help obtain their goals, yet they continued to abstain 
from the elections.  Sinn Féin was not allowed to run for positions by the 
Stormont government; even though the government lifted the proscription in 
1974, Sinn Féin continued to call on its supporters to abstain from the voting.53   
This changed in 1980 and 1981, when the IRA and Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) prisoners in the H-Block of the Maze prison went on a 
hunger strike in protest of losing their status as political prisoners.  Bobby Sands, 
Officer Commanding IRA prisoners in Long Kesh and the leader of the strike, 
won the vote for Member of Parliament (MP) of Fermanagh and South Tyrone 
under the Anti H-Block party;54 however, he did not take the position because he 
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Politico’s Publishing, 2001), 270.   
53 Ibid., 274. 
54 Ibid., 13. 
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died during the hunger strike of 1980.55  The support Bobby Sands received by 
the populace provided Sinn Féin the confidence it needed to start running in 
political elections.   
In 1979, members of Sinn Féin realized that the armed-struggle was not 
the only way to reunify Ireland and that they needed to pursue additional 
measures.56  Even though the Sinn Féin’s policy changed, the armed struggle 
did not take second place to politics and the political philosophy, “Armalite and 
the Box,” was born.  Peter Taylor wrote, “The notion that Provisionals could move 
towards their goal of a united Ireland by pursuing a twin strategy of violence and 
politics convinced most of the doubters who by this time had realized that, were 
the ‘Brits’ to leave Ireland, it wouldn’t be at the point of a gun.  The ‘long war’ was 
now to be fought on two fronts.”57  The “Armalite and the Box” policy created at 
the 1981 Ard Fheis allowed elected Sinn Féin candidates, starting at the 1982 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections, to take their positions in the local councils 
in Northern Ireland and allowed the party to contest elections of the North and 
South.58  Members of Sinn Féin then began running for office while still 
maintaining its abstentionist policy until 1985; this year, they received 59% of the 
seats and changed their constitution to allow members to take their seats at the 
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Dáil.  Throughout the years, the popularity of Sinn Féin depended on the events 
performed by the IRA; for the purpose of this paper, individuals which supported 
Sinn Féin are considered to have supported the IRA.   
Voting records are available since the inception of Northern Ireland.  Table 
1 provides the number of individuals who voted for Sinn Féin since they 
participated in elections.  Elections in Northern Ireland changed in 1972 when 
Stormont parliament was suspended by the British Government and Direct Rule 
was implemented.  The Northern Irish populus was then allowed to elect 
individuals for seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, which over the years 
consisted of different entities: the Northern Ireland Assembly (1973 to 1974); the 
Constitutional Convention (1975 to 1976); the Northern Ireland Assembly (1982 
to 1986); the Northern Ireland Forum (1996 to 1998) and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (1998 to 2003).59  They elected representatives MPs for the 
Westminster Parliament in the Westminster General Elections.  In addition, they 
voted in local government (district council) elections.  The voting procedure for 
the local government changed in 1973 giving more residents of Northern Ireland 
the ability to vote.  Elections for the European parliament occur every five years, 
where “voting is by means of PR (Proportional Representation) with three 
members being returned as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).”60  
From the values presented in Table 1, one can see that Sinn Féin did not run for 
political positions until 1982, and even though they had a name on a ballot, they 
did not initially fill those seats (due to the commitment they had to the party line).   
While it was generally considered that the support for Sinn Féin increased 
over time, Figure 1 demonstrates that this was not always the case; increase in 
the support for Sinn Féin usually only occurred when cease-fires were called.61   
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D. THE BRITISH ARMY 
The structure of the British Army is as follows: a group of soldiers, 
approximately 30,000 individuals, are placed into a corps consisting of two or 
more divisions; the corps are commanded by a lieutenant general and are 
grouped into a common function, i.e., Intelligence Corps, Royal Logistic Corps, or 
Royal Corps of Signals.62  A division consists of roughly 10,000 individuals, 
commanded by a Major-General, and has three infantry and/or armored 
brigades, an artillery brigade, a signal regiment, a logistic regiment, an engineer 
regiment, and supporting units.63  Regiments are commanded by a Lieutenant-
Colonel and are divided into a company; companies are a group of approximately 
100 soldiers, commanded by a Major.  The companies are divided into platoons, 
a group of roughly 30 soldiers, commanded by a Lieutenant or Second 
Lieutenant.  Finally, the platoons are broken down into a chapter, a group of eight 
soldiers, who are commanded by a Corporal.64   
The British Army was an early participant in the Irish-British Conflict, 
primarily due to the unrest associated with the “marching season.”  The marching 
season begins in May and lasts until August, and is a time when Protestants in 
Northern Ireland celebrate their historical victories.  Conducted through mainly 
Catholic neighborhoods and often celebrating events where Protestants were 
victorious over Catholics, these marches quickly became centers of fighting.65 
In early 1969, the isolated incidents of conflict among the Catholics, 
Protestants, and police started to increase.  Utilities, bus and gas stations were 
bombed.  There was fighting at civil rights marches, sit-downs of demonstrators 
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arose throughout the cities, and shops were looted.66  The civil unrest among 
groups became more prevalent.  The IRA originally intended to use peace and 
politics to obtain its goals.  By mobilization of the masses, they could undermine 
the Northern State and gain support in the South for their policies.  They tried to 
prevent violence, however they realized that their message was only heard when 
violence was used; the British Government became involved in the conflict 
shortly after the evening news displayed images of an unarmed Catholic Member 
of Parliament being beaten by a Protestant police force during a civil rights march 
in Derry.67   
The RUC, unprepared for the resistance they received during the 
marches, obtained the right to use tougher measures to enforce the peace after 
an emergency Cabinet meeting.  They also mobilized the British Army for the 
sole purpose of guarding key installations and to tighten security; they did not 
help one side or the other.68  The Wilson Government (Westminster) remained 
on the sidelines, believing that the Northern Ireland government would respond 
to the needs of their citizens; meanwhile, the Northern Ireland Parliament stated 
the Stormont Government “would not be held ransom by irresponsible and anti-
social elements.”69  
After the clashes at the marches started to become deadly, the police in 
Northern Ireland realized they were unable to maintain peace and asked for 
additional resources.  The leaders of the Stormont Government were originally 
reluctant to call in British troops; for the Home Secretary stated if troops were 
requested, constitutional changes may result, i.e., Stormont might be suspended 
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and Direct Rule imposed.  Instead, the Stormont Government drew up 
emergency plans to assist police if the violence intensified.70   
The Protestants thought that the troops were in Northern Ireland to kill 
Catholics; the Catholics, on the other hand, thought that the troops were there to 
fight for their safety.  Both were wrong.  The army was not present for the benefit 
of either side; their sole purpose was to maintain peace.  The Prime Minister of 
Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, stated that “British soldiers had been 
authorized to shoot on sight anyone ‘acting suspiciously’…the army was ‘not 
prepared to take half measures with terrorists’.”  At a later date, he stated that 
these orders were only to be used during instances where firearms or explosives 
might be used.71   
The Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch stated the following to help the public 
understand his position: 
Recognizing, however, that the reunification of the national territory 
can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it is our 
intention to request the British Government to enter into early 
negotiations with the Irish Government to review the present 
constitutional position of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland.72   
Nationalists thought that this meant that British Government would help them 
with the fighting.  Loyalists thought it indicated the beginning of doomsday.   
Westminster was still hoping that the people of Ireland would solve its own 
problems.  It wanted to see the current government develop policies which would 
enable peace.  Yet, the police force was accused of brutality and unable to 
maintain peace, increasing the dependence on the army to maintain peace.  The 
army had been accustomed to performing internal security and counter  
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revolutionary warfare in other countries and they were not familiar with working 
within their own country; consequently, many of its members were uncomfortable 
with the actions they had to take.73 
In 1969, the Labor Party, now in power, worked to gain civil rights for the 
nationalists, aid for economic development, jobs, and housing.  The British Army 
took over security control and, as a result, disarmed the RUC (an unarmed police 
force is common practice in Britain); in addition, they disbanded the B Specials, 
replacing them with the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited part-
time force under the command of the British Army.74  The Westminster and 
Stormont governments hoped this would appease the loyalists, but the loyalists 
thought the two governments were bending to meet the nationalist’s demands.  
This miscommunication resulted in more riots.75 
Even though the crime rate decreased with the army present in Northern 
Ireland, the tension between the loyalists and nationalists increased.  The IRA’s 
goals had changed from demonstrating against civil-rights injustices to protecting 
themselves from the loyalists; the loyalists continued to work to ensure that 
Northern Ireland remained a part of the UK and tried to prevent the IRA from 
obtaining its goal of removing British rule.76   
During the next marching season (1970), the Protestants bragged about 
their victories over the Catholics in nationalist locations; this resulted in an 
increase of violence between the nationalists and loyalists and forced the 
Westminster Parliament to respond to the hostility in Northern Ireland.  The 
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British army was called in to protect the Irish.  Instilling anger in the nationalists, 
the army instituted a curfew during the rioting and searched their houses for 
illegal weapons.  On February 5, 1970, the Public Order Act went into effect, 
barring sit-ins and occupation of public buildings, requiring a three-day notice of 
demonstrations and giving the home secretary the right to ban marches.  This 
Act was defied by the Catholics, who as a result increased their violence in 
response to these political actions.    
“Unwillingly the Brits had handled the IRA an issue that it could exploit to 
justify its actions against soldiers no longer depicted as saviors but as the 
coerces of occupation,”77 writes Peter Taylor.  The tougher the army became, the 
more recruits the IRA drafted.  Taylor continues, the “convention decided to 
continue and intensify the provision of defensive measures for the people of the 
Six Counties.  It re-affirmed that British rule is not acceptable in Ireland under any 
circumstances and that every effort must be made to bring about its downfall.”78  
James Chichester-Clark, a unionist prime minister, ruled out any possibility of 
including Ulster Catholics in a coalition government on the grounds that the 
opposition Catholics in Ulster’s parliament were “opposed to the very existence 
of this state itself.”79 
Brigadier Frank Kitson’s plan for the British Army was to try to win back 
the support of the local population, but the IRA was not interested in helping the 
British restore order and was not supportive of the actions taken by the British 
Army towards their organization.  The British Army and the RUC neglected to 
share intelligence, causing them to lose opportunities to apprehend suspected 
IRA members, thus benefiting the IRA.  The IRA justified its attacks on British 
soldiers and Northern Irish police officers, stating that their actions were in 
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response to the way the army was treating the Catholic community.80  The 
Stormont Parliament stated that “’sinister and irresponsible’ elements 
sympathetic to the Irish Republic had been responsible for the current 
violence.”81 
The British Army focused their actions on the IRA.  They said, “Although 
our tactics were reasonably well defined, the strategy certainly was not.  We had 
to adapt to the situation as it grew.  After all, the IRA was not reacting to a long-
term strategy.”82  Riots occurred after the army shot dead “rumored” members of 
IRA and the IRA retaliated.  This was the pivotal turning point.  The 
peacekeeping mission was no longer relevant, so the army actively focused their 
activities on defeating the IRA prompting Chichester-Clark, prime minister of 
Northern Ireland, to declare on television “Northern Ireland is at war with the Irish 
Republican Army Provisional.”83 
In 1976, the activities of the British Army were limited, and the RUC 
became the lead agency for the war against terrorism.84  This change was made 
because the British government felt that the IRA would be less reluctant to fight 
against their fellow Irishmen as opposed to the Brits; however, as evidenced in 
Table 2, this did reduce the numbers of active duty army in Northern Ireland.  
This did not impact the activities of the Special Air Service (SAS) nor the role of 
the 14 Intelligence Company.85   
The British Army continued to fight in Northern Ireland, acting second in 
command to the RUC.  In 1997, the British Army had its last casualty to the  
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hands of the IRA.  A young soldier, Stephen Restorick, was shot by an IRA 
sniper team in South Armagh.  The final cease-fire was called by the IRA a few 
months later on July 20, 1997.86   
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IV. THE MODELING EFFORT 
This chapter introduces the biological Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, 
describes the assumptions associated with the model, and provides an 
explanation of how the model functions.  It justifies why the British Army and the 
Irish Republican Army are considered the predator and prey, respectively.  The 
population numbers utilized for the model and the output of the model are also 
provided.  Lastly, there is an explanation about why this modeling effort is 
important and how it may aid in the War against Terrorism.    
 
A. THE MODEL:  LOTKA-VOLTERRA PREDATOR-PREY MODEL 
Figure 2 is a graph of the deaths of the members of the British Army and 
the Irish Republican Army.  After examining this data and the dynamics of the 
two main participants in the Thirty-Years War, Lotka-Volterra predator-prey 
model was deemed the most appropriate of all of the different types of biological 
models available to analyze the data.   
The Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model is commonly used to describe 
predator and prey competition, diet selection, handling time, and intra- and inter-
species relationships.87  This model, developed in the 1920s and 1930s 
independently by two individuals, Alfred Lotka and Vito Volterra, is utilized to 
describe the fluctuating population sizes of two competing species.  While there 
are many variations to this model, a simple supply and demand equation drives 
the model.  There are some basic assumptions associated with the model: 
 
1. “Prey will grow in an unlimited way when predators do not keep them 
under control. 
2. Predators depend on the presence of their prey to survive. 
                                            
87 Fryxell, J. and P Lundberg,   Individual Behavior and Community Dynamics (New York:   
Chapman & Hall, 1988.   Leah Edelstein-Kesht, Mathematical Models in Biology. (New York: 
Random House, 1988), 220–221.   
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3. The rate of predation depends on the likelihood that a victim is 
encountered by a predator. 
4. The growth rate of the predator population is proportional to food 
intake (rate of predation).”88 
 
The creation of this model, consistent with these assumptions, leads to the 
following two equations: 
bxyax
dt
dx −=  
dxycy
dt




x is the prey population; 
y is the predator population; 
a is the growth rate of the prey population when predators are 
absent (it is a positive quantity with dimensions of 1/time);  
c is the net death rate of the predators in the absence of prey;   
xy approximates the likelihood that an encounter will occur between 
both species if they move randomly and are distributed uniformly 
throughout their habitat; and  
b/d describes the efficiency of predation, converting a unit of prey 
into a unit of predator mass.89   
A graph of the two populations, predator and prey, fluctuates between 
increasing and decreasing values; on the graph, the line representing the 
predator is slightly offset from the line representing the prey (Figure 3).   
An analysis of the graph and understanding the biology behind the 
equation demonstrates that one population will never be the sole reason for the 
extinction of another population.  The relationship between the lynx and the 
snowshoe hare are two species which can help explain the dynamics of this 
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model:  the lynx, which preys on hares, converts the energy they gain from eating 
the hares into producing young.  As the lynx eats the hares, the hare population 
decreases in size and more energy from the hares is converted to energy used to 
reproduce.  The lynx population increases and, as a result, their consumption of 
hares increases.  As the hares are preyed upon by the lynx, there are fewer 
hares to support the lynx population, resulting in a decrease in the lynx 
population.  As the lynx population decreases, the hare population recovers.  As 
the hare population recovers, there is more food available for the lynx, and the 
cycle starts again.  The relationship described by the model is that the lynx 
causes the hare population to crash and the lack of hares causes the lynx 
population to decrease.  Because of the nature of their relationship, neither 
population will go extinct due solely to the interaction between the two.  Other 
outside forces, such as a loss of habitat, introduction of disease, or a cause other 
than the variables of the predator-prey relationship are more significant factors 
that impact the survivability of the two species.   
The basic Lotka-Volterra equation has been modified by many scientists 
to describe the interactions between different organizations.90  It has been used 
to explain the dynamics between two organisms competing for the same 
resource, such as in disease.  This model has acceptance from biologists who 
use it to examine the relationship between foxes and pheasants, moose and 
wolves, and spiders and flies.  However, it is thought that because of humans’ 
additional mental capacity – especially the ability to use emotions and manipulate 
their surroundings – we do not experience the basic biological rules of other 
organisms, thus causing biological models to be ineffective at describing the 
relationship between fighting human populations.  As a result, sociologists 
developed models to understand human behavior during times of war (as 
described in Chapter 2).  None of the existing models is successful in analyzing 
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terrorist organizations, perhaps because these models cannot adequately 
describe the unique phenomena of terrorist groups. 
Terrorist organizations utilize sleeper cells to maintain their status when 
they go into hiding; this enables them to sustain their allegiance to their 
organization while remaining hidden from their enemies.  In essence, they are 
the low population of “hares” that always remain in the population; because of 
their limited visibility, they are difficult to “hunt.”  Their population is sufficient to 
secretly recruit individuals and maintain a low level of activity.  They too (just like 
the hares) are never removed from the population.  Once the pressure from the 
government – the lynx – is reduced, they begin to openly recruit individuals 
again.  This behavior, along with second cue seen in the dynamics between then 
two organizations described in depth below, indicates that the Lotka-Volterra 
model is a good model for this study. 
 
B. THE KEY MODELING DECISION – SINN FÉIN VERSUS THE BRITISH 
ARMY 
The terrorist organization selected for study in this thesis is the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (IRA).  Since 1997, the IRA has been in a permanent 
ceasefire; also, in the summer of 2005, after the terrorist bombing in London by 
al-Qaeda, the IRA declared that they were fully disarmed and no longer seeking 
an active terrorist role to obtain their goals of unifying all of Ireland under one 
rule.91  Because of these two factors, much of the information about IRA became 
available (particularly more so than other terrorist organizations which are still 
                                            
91 On September 26, 2005, a statement was released by the IRA through the British 
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Republican Army (IRA) Statement on Putting Arms Beyond Use, (26 September 2005),” CAIN 
Web Service, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira260905.htm [Accessed 15 October 
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active). 92  Furthermore, the IRA’s actions continue to be relevant; the events are 
recent enough that readers can remember some of the impacts that the IRA had 
on its people and the surrounding areas.  
As discussed in the prior chapter, the fighting in Ireland did not just consist 
solely of two groups; there were a number of organizations involved, including 
the British Security Forces, Republican Paramilitary Groups, Loyalist Paramilitary 
Groups and Irish Security Forces.  One might feel it would be difficult to 
determine the direct effect of one group on another; however, when the number 
of Irish Republican Army members (the number of Provisional and Original IRA 
members were grouped by the author of this data) killed by different 
organizations (Table 3) are analyzed, one clearly identifies that the British Army 
was its biggest predator.  The death statistics were readily available for the 
British Army and the IRA because the deceased’s loyalty to one of these 
organizations was revealed at their death.93  The RUC kept good records and is 
the basic source for Northern Irish fatalities.  The Belfast office of the Irish Times 
kept the same information as the RUC but included more detailed information 
about the victim; for example, the circumstances surrounding the death, the killer 
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following statement indicating the disarmament of the IRA.  “The leadership of Oglaigh nah 
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Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign, (28 July 2005),” Cain Web Service, 
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93 A member of the IRA would generally keep their membership secret.  However, during 
their funeral, the status of their membership usually becomes public, especially by who attends 
the funeral.   
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and the characteristics of the victim.  The Irish Times maintains death statistics 
after 1971; the Belfast Newsletter recorded the first 100 deaths.  The British 
Army also maintains information regarding violence and security force counter-
measures.94  Figure 2 depicts the number of deaths per year by organization.  
The relationship between the two is offset in a similar cyclical pattern as the 
Lotka-Volterra model (seen in Figure 3); this provides the confidence that the 
Lotka-Volterra model is a good choice to describe the population dynamics of the 
British Army and the IRA.   
The Lotka-Volterra model mimics nature, where the predator drives the 
population of the prey.  The pivotal event determining who should be the predator 
and who should be the prey is the infamous Bloody Sunday.95  This event 
triggered the IRA to resume an active campaign against the British.  Thus, the 
predator for this model is considered the British Army.96  The prey, whose 
population sizes are dependant on the predator, is the Irish Republican Army. 
It is difficult to distinguish an offset cyclical-wave relationship between the 
two groups when the population of the British Army and the IRA are compared.  
This is because of the British Army’s unique population dynamic.  The army, as 
described above, is a static population because the army is set to a pre-
determined size.  (Everyone in a platoon has a set job; if someone leaves that 
post, another person replaces that individual.)  The size of the British Army  
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changed as the number of platoons in Ireland changed, with little to no impact 
due to the number of casualties.  The number of British Army personnel in 
Ireland by year can be seen in Table 2.   
The British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary intelligence reports 
revealed that the Irish Republican Army was organized in cell structures; this 
makes it difficult to ascertain the actual size of the membership.97  After a 
thorough examination of the available information, the best estimate of the 
membership of the IRA was that it peaked around 1,500 in the mid-1970s.  This 
number decreased to roughly 500 members during the 1994 cease-fire, 
coinciding with the adoption of a new organization of the IRA in 1979.98  The 
members of the IRA were considered a “reasonably stable group of people.”99  
Psychiatric examinations generally determined them to be a group of individuals 
with “clear ideals and goals” and had leadership and support from other 
members of the group.”100  While these individuals appeared to be just like our 
neighbors, they must have believed that their cause was worth the terror.   
Many members of the IRA were arrested and jailed, decreasing the size of 
their organization and further creating the need for the cells or 'active service 
units'.  The 'cell structure' was not only adopted in response to declining 
popularity in nationalist areas, but also for strategic reasons to avoid penetration 
by the security forces.  Roughly 3,000 individuals were charged with terrorist 
offenses between 1976 and 1979.  Most of these individuals were charged with 
terrorist offensives based on confessions obtained under interrogation, implying 
to the leadership of the IRA that their volunteers were unable to withstand the 
pressures of interrogation.  To counteract this, IRA leadership minimized the 
amount of information provided to each individual; limiting the amount of 
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information the arrested individual would provide the army or the police about the 
IRA when under duress.  A cell, or a basic IRA unit, consisted of only three to 
four members; they were known to each other by pseudonyms and they had no 
knowledge of the names of their superiors.  Their actions were directed to the 
group by an anonymous controller.101   
Because the population numbers were not readily available, a different 
method was required to determine the rough population estimate of the IRA for 
the model.  As discussed above, Sinn Féin was the political arm of the struggle of 
the Catholic Irish; therefore, the numbers of individuals voting to support Sinn 
Féin gives a rough estimate of those in support of the IRA.  Because of Sinn Féin 
voting abstention until 1982, this study was limited to the last 20 years of the 
conflict.  Consequently, public support of Sinn Féin was considered as the 
population of the IRA.   
 
C. KNOWN POPULATION NUMBERS  
There is voting data for almost all years since 1982.  By taking the 
percentages of individuals who voted for Sinn Féin and using the number of 
votes to determine the number of individuals supporting Sinn Féin, the support 
for the terrorist organization was determined.  In the years that voting did not 
occur, data for those years were interpolated by taking the average of 
neighboring years, as presented in Table 4.  The number of British Army troops 
in Northern Ireland is included in Table 2.  For the years that data was not 
available, the numbers were interpolated using the surrounding years.  The 
number of votes was originally provided as percentages, as documented in Table 
1; the numbers listed in Table 5 were calculated by multiplying the percentage by 
the total number of votes, providing an explanation why the data is not listed in 
whole numbers.  The same procedure was performed to obtain number of British 
Army personnel in the years where no numbers were reported.  
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D. THE MODEL 
Because the two populations, the British Army and Sinn Féin were not 
within the predetermined assumptions of the Lotka-Volterra model (Section “The 
Model:  Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey Model”) the model was modified to meet 
the anomalies.  The first adaptation introduced a term placing a limit on the size 
of the population, called the carrying capacity.  The carrying capacity is the 
maximum size a population can reach; this is due to the environment’s ability to 
sustain a maximum number of individuals.  After the carrying capacity is reached, 
the population will slightly increase, then, quickly decline; a stable population will 
remain at the carrying capacity.  Carrying capacity is calculated by making the 
growth rate dependant on the density.  Thus, a term, which creates a density-
dependent growth rate, is as follows: 
)1()(
K
NrNg −=  
 
where: 
N is the population size;  
r is the intrinsic growth rate; and  
K is the carrying capacity. 
 
When the change in population size over time is equal to zero, then N = K.  
When the change of population size over time is greater than zero, the 
population is less than the carrying capacity; when the change in population size 
is less than zero, the population is more than carrying capacity.  As individuals 
compete for food, habitat and other limited resources during crowded conditions, 
an increase in the net population mortality is observed.  The effects are most 
pronounced when there are increasing encounters between individuals.   
The second term represents a mortality rate proportional to the rate of 





dN −=  
where: 
N is the population size;  
r is the intrinsic growth rate;  
K is the carrying capacity; and 
t is the change in time. 
 
When there is competition between species as in a predator prey 
scenario, the carrying capacity is still in effect and this variable must be included 
in the formula.  Therefore, the final formulas have a term which contains a term 
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dy +−=  
In the case of terrorist groups, limiting factors would be such components as 
money, housing, arms, communication, etc. 
There are a few deviations of the relationship described by the model that 
need to be considered when examining the relationship between Sinn Féin and 
the British Army.  The first anomaly concerns the predator’s (the British Army) 
population change over time.  When an individual dies in the British Army, that 
person is replaced by another soldier, so the population remains static unless the 
number of platoons is changed; this creates a difference of 30 soldiers at a time 
as opposed to one.  Therefore, the model was altered to incorporate these data.  
Secondly, the carrying capacity of the population (the number of individuals the 
system can maintain) was also incorporated into the model. 
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Using the actual number of troops for the predator and the parameters 
listed below for Equation 2 and MatLab Version 7.0.1.24704 (R14) Service Pack 











A = British Army population 
b = 0.005, the hunting efficiency of the British Army 
c = 100, the recruitment rate of the IRA 
e = 500, rate at which the IRA reaches carrying capacity 
K = 400000, the carrying capacity of the IRA 
 
Figure 4 shows the comparison of the actual number of votes for Sinn 
Féin versus the predicted number of votes.  Visual inspection demonstrates that 
although the numbers are different, the trends are consistent.    
Visual inspection of the data is important, but it is also valuable to conduct 
statistical analyses to indicate the strength of the similarities between the 
observed data and the expected or predicted data.  There are many tests which 
test the differences between the expected and observed data.  A very common 
test is the chi-square.  This test is used to examine the goodness of fit, or when 
one set of numbers differs from what might be expected by chance.  Chi-square 
is a non-parametric test of significance examining whether or not two samples 
are different.  Because it is non-parametric, it does not require the sample data to 
be normally distributed; however, the population from which the sample is drawn 
does need to be normally distributed.  Other assumptions include the sample 
must be randomly drawn from the population; the data must be reported in raw 
frequencies; measured variables must be independent; values and categories on 
independent and dependent variables must be mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive; and observed frequencies cannot be too small.  Considering it is a 
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non-parametric test, the data can be run on nominal, interval and ordinal data.  
Examination of the data proves that in the actual population less than 95.45% of 
the data is within two standard deviations of the mean, thus the data is not 
normal and it needs to be transformed for the chi-square test to produce accurate 
results.  Performing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the data indicated that the 
data was consistent with a log normal distribution.102  Therefore, a base 10-log 
transformation was applied to the data.  After the transformation, it was found 
that the chi-square value of the data was 0.999907 and had a p value > 0.1, thus 
the null hypothesis is accepted, and there are no described differences between 
the data.   
Pearson’s R and Spearman’s R are two additional tests used to describe 
the correlation between the two datasets.  Both are correlation statistics intended 
to measure interval scales.  Pearson’s R correlation assumes that the two 
variables are measured on an interval scale and determines the extent that two 
variables are proportional to each other.  Spearman’s R is a non-parametric test 
and is only sensitive to ordinal arrangement of values; therefore, it is not 
impacted by curvilinearity in the data.  Both values provide a correlation 
coefficient, which ranges from a value of +1.0 to -1.0.  The value of +1.0 
represents a perfect positive correlation and a value of -1.0 represents a perfect 
negative correlation.103  Pearson’s R for the non-transformed data (the data does 
not need to be in a normal distribution) is 0.8077 and the Pearson’s R for the 
transformed data is 0.6835.  The Spearman’s R for the data ranked into ordinal 
numbers is 0.609. 
Analyses of the data proves that the population of support for Sinn Féin is 
consistent with the model.  Changing the parameters does not have a significant 
impact on the model; changes cause the distribution to shift to the right or left, 
but the general trends of the model remain the same.   
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When comparing the modeled population to the actual voting population, 
there are many similarities.  As terrorist activity decreased in Northern Ireland 
and the IRA maintained their ceasefire, the British Army decreased the presence 
of the army in the region; this eased tensions and allowed the British Army to 
increase the army presence in areas which needed a stronger military 
presence.104  The decrease in the number of army personnel (the predator) 
resulted in a drastically increase in Sinn Féin votes in the latter years, particularly 
the late 1990s; this phenomena was predicted by the model.  
A final way to analyze the model’s effectiveness is to the correlate the 
data with the history of the war in Northern Ireland, which also supports that the 
model is accurate.  The decrease in support in the mid 1980s occurred when the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, (strengthening the relationship between the British and 
Republic of Ireland) was not a republican agenda.105   As seen in Table 1, votes 
for the unionist block increased as votes for the nationalists decreased.  The 
decrease in support in 1994 was probably due to a cease-fire; Sinn Féin and IRA 
both promised that there would be no cease fire, yet the Army Council voted to 
support a four- month cease fire.106  The model diverges from the actual data 
from 1997 to the present; this is expected because the IRA agreed to a cease-
fire, changing the dynamics between IRA and the British Army.   
The model itself cannot predict the number of individuals in support of the 
IRA in a particular year, but rather, it can be used to predict the trends of support, 
and, more specifically, popular support.  Popular support influences recruitment 
efforts, the size, and the impact of the actions taken by the IRA.  This 
demonstrates that further development of biological models may be used to 
predict the recruitment of terrorist organizations. 
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E. THE MODELED DATA 
It was difficult to find the actual numbers of the membership of the IRA.  
This may be because I do not have security clearance to gain access to the data; 
however, I feel it is because of the secretive nature of terrorist organizations.  I 
think it would be difficult for any individual, with or without a security clearance, to 
determine the actual membership.  Without this data, another means of 
calculating membership data must be determined.  Sinn Féin, a political party in 
support of the actions of the Irish Republican Army, was a good selection 
because their elections are open and individuals can freely elect whom they 
desire to support.  This type of analysis cannot be performed for every terrorist 
organization; however, this thesis demonstrated that the trends of support can be 
determined by analyzing how the population numbers of the British Army 
changed over time.  This indicates preliminary support to the original hypothesis 
– terrorist organizations are working under the same stressors as wildlife 
populations.  An adaptation of this model may help governments analyze the 
trends in these organizations and assist in determining their approach to 
eliminating terrorism.   Further research, such as greater analysis of social 
organization, is necessary; however, this is a good first step to identifying the 
drivers of the “terrorist” social organization.  Future modeling should be 
developed to recognize trends and help identify how governments may 
counteract these organizations.  The success of this model to predict past trends 
of the interaction of Sinn Féin and the British Army also indicates that the use of 
biological models in developing a better understanding of terrorist population 
dynamics as opposed to gang models or a sociological-focused studies.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
Policymakers use the output of models to develop tactics for fighting the 
war on terrorism.  In order for governments to succeed in this war, it is important 
for tactics to be developed from models that are accurately describing their 
subject’s behavior.  A review of the current literature demonstrates that models 
currently used to understand the dynamics of terrorist organizations are not 
providing an accurate analysis or prediction of the behavior of terrorist 
organizations.  The analysts are depending on sociological models.  These 
models are not suitable because they do not incorporate the use of violent 
behavior vectors into their formulas; they are utilizing non-violent models to 
describe violence between individuals, and the results are inaccurate.  If the 
current models were appropriate, there would be many more published 
resources available on modeling terrorist organizations. 
It would be logical to think that gang models would be an appropriate 
method to understand terrorist organizations.  However, as described by this 
thesis, gangs and terrorist organizations are very different from each other.  
Gang researchers are utilizing models that integrate violent behavior into models, 
which were originally developed to study non-violent behavior.  Therefore, gang 
models do not provide the rigorous analysis needed to understand the behavior 
of terrorist organizations.   
This thesis introduces an alternative and more appropriate method for 
modeling terrorist behavior.  It capitalizes on models that were developed to 
explain the violent behavior in animals and plants as is seen in terrorist 
organizations.  Biological models are used to describe competition between 
individuals as well as populations.  The models were developed to examine the 
use of weaponry between individuals, to determine when one species caused 
another to go extinct, and to identify which species will survive in a fight over 
resources.  Biologists have also used the same models to examine community 
dynamics.  They have used models in many different biological communities to 
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describe their social structure, selection of habitats, mates, and prey, time of food 
consumption and recruitment.  Considering biological models already incorporate 
the dynamics that exist between terrorist organizations and their victims, as well 
as provide the population dynamics of a selected population, it was only natural 
to examine whether or not they were appropriate to help understand the 
dynamics seen in terrorist organizations.   
For the case study, this thesis utilized a Lotka-Volterra predator-prey 
model to describe the recruitment behavior of a terrorist organization.  Even 
though the examination was relatively simple and preliminary, it was successful 
in describing the trends seen in the case study population.  This method is more 
appropriate for examining the growth and decline of terrorist organizations 
through the interaction of law enforcement and terrorist recruitment efforts than 
any other method presented thus far.  Biological models were developed to 
incorporate competition between species and individuals, as well as fighting and 
organized warfare between species.  They look to determine which population 
will succeed in a competition over resources and shared habitats. The results of 
the case study demonstrate how a biological model can be utilized to understand 
the actions of a terrorist organization, and offer predictive value that sociological 
models lack.  This can result in a change of the current tactics (i.e., policies) 
developed to fight terrorism; hopefully, making them more appropriate. 
The model utilized in this thesis is an appropriate method to analyze the 
recruitment of terrorist organizations.  Luckily, this is not the only behavior of 
terrorist organizations that can be explained by biological models.  Examination 
of the biological literature proves that other types of biological models are 
available to be modified, exactly as described in this thesis, to aid in the analysis 
of other aspects of terrorist organizations.  Additional research should focus on 
identifying and developing these models to help fight the War on Terrorism.   
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APPENDIX 














































Figure 1.   Voting Trend of the Northern Ireland Population for Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland 
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Figure 2.   British and Irish Republican Army Deaths Per Year 
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Figure 4.   Actual Votes for Sinn Féin vs. Predicted Number of Votes 
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Election Total Unionist 
Total 
Nationalist Unionist Bloc Nationalist Bloc Non Confessional Other 
   UUP DUP Other U. SDLP SF Other N. APNI Other Non  
1969 Stormont 67.4 18.8 61.1 - 6.3 - 18.8 - 8.1 5.7 
1970 
Westminster 58.8 23.3 54.3 - 4.5 - 23.3 - 12.6 5.1 
1973 Local 
Government 56.6 19.2 41.4 4.3 10.9 13.4 5.8 13.7 2.5 8.0 
1973 Assembly 61.9 24.1 29.3 10.8 21.8 22.1 2.0 9.2 2.6 1.0 
1974 
Westminster 64.2 26.9 32.3 8.2 23.7 22.4 4.5 3.2 2.4 3.3 
1974 




62.5 25.9 25.8 14.8 21.9 23.7 2.2 9.8 1.4 0.4 
1977 Local 
Government 50.8 24.7 29.6 12.7 8.5 20.6 4.1 14.4 0.8 8.3 
1979 
Westminster 59.0 28.1 36.6 10.2 12.2 19.9 8.2 11.8 - 2.1 
1979 European 59.0 31.3 21.9 29.8 7.3 24.6 6.7 6.8 - 2.9 
1981 Local 
Government 57.3 22.8 26.5 26.6 4.2 17.5 5.3 8.9 1.8 8.2 
1982 Assembly 59.4 28.9 29.7 23.0 6.7 18.8 10.1 - 9.3 2.7 0.7 
1983 
Westminster 57.0 31.3 34.0 20.0 3.0 17.9 13.4 - 8.0 1.9 1.6 
1984 European 58.0 35.4 21.5 33.6 2.9 22.1 13.3 - 5.0 1.3 0.3 
1985 Local 





71.5 18.7 51.7 14.6 5.2 12.1 6.6 - 5.5 3.1 1.2 
1987 
Westminster 54.9 32.5 37.8 11.7 5.4 21.1 11.4 - 10.0 2.6 - 
1989 Local 
Government 54.9 32.5 31.4 17.8 5.7 21.2 11.3 - 6.8 2.1 3.7 
1989 
European 56.2 34.7 21.5 29.9 4.8 25.5 9.2 - 5.2 1.1 2.8 
1992 
Westminster 55.8 33.5 34.5 13.1 8.2 23.5 10.0 - 8.7 - 2.0 
1993 Local 
Government 50.8 34.6 29.0 17.2 4.6 21.9 12.5 0.2 7.7 1.0 5.9 
1994 European 54.0 38.8 23.8 29.2 1.0 28.9 9.9 - 4.1 0.5 2.6 
1996 Forum 52.9 36.9 24.2 18.8 9.9 21.4 15.5 - 6.5 2.5 1.2 
1997 
Westminster 50.5 40.2 32.7 13.6 4.2 24.1 16.1 - 8.0 0.7 0.3 
1997 Local 
Government 47.5 37.6 27.8 15.6 4.1 20.7 16.9 - 6.5 - 8.4 
1998 Assembly 47.4 39.6 21.3 18.0 8.1 21.9 17.7 - 6.5 2.0 4.5 
1999 European 52.2 45.5 17.6 28.3 6.3 28.1 17.4 - 2.1 - 0.2 
2001 
Westminster 52.7 42.7 26.8 22.5 3.4 21.0 21.7 - 3.6 1.0 - 
2001 Local 
Government 47.0 40.1 22.9 21.4 2.7 19.4 20.7 - 5.1 0.6 7.1 
2003 Assembly 51.7 40.7 22.7 25.7 3.3 17.0 23.5 0.2 3.7 1.0 2.9 
2004 European 48.6 42.2 16.6 32.0 - 15.9 26.3 - - - 9.2 
2005 
Westminster 51.8 41.8 17.7 33.7 0.4 17.5 24.3 - 3.9 0.2 2.2 
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2005 Local 
Government 48.8 40.7 18.0 29.6 1.2 17.4 23.3 - 5.0 0.2 5.4 
 
Table 1.   Voting Percentages in Northern Ireland107 
                                            
107 Martin Melaugh, “Political party support in Northern Ireland, 1969 to the present,” CAIN Web Service, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electsum.htm [Accessed 10 November 2004].   
54 
Year British Army 
Personnel 
1969 (Jun) 2700 
1970 (Jan) 8100 
1971 11800 
1972 22800 
1972 (Jul) 30300 

















1990 Not Reported 
1991 Not Reported 
1992 17417 
1993 Not Reported 
1994 (Jul) 19500 
1995 Not Reported 
1996 Not Reported 
1997 Not Reported 
1998 15500 
1999 15500 
2000 (Jun) 13500 
2001 13000 
Table 2.   The Number of Reported British Army Personnel by Year in Northern 
Ireland108 
                                            
108 Fionnuala McKenna, et al., “Background Information on Northern Ireland Society- 
Security and Defense,”  CAIN Web Service,  http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#03 [Site 
Accessed 29 October 2004].   
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Organizations in Northern Ireland 
Number of Individuals Per 
Organization Killed by 
British Army Personnel 
British Army 5 
Civilian 151 
Civilian Political Activist 1 
Irish National Liberation Army 5 
Irish People's Liberation Organization 1 
Irish Republican Army 96 
Irish Republican Army Youth Section 12 
Official Irish Republican Army 9 
Official Irish Republican Army Youth Section 2 
Royal Ulster Constabulary 2 
Ulster Defense Association 6 
Ulster Defense Regiment 2 
Ulster Volunteer Force 5 
TOTAL 297 
Table 3.   Number of Individuals by Organization Killed by the British Army109 
                                            
109 Malcolm Sutton, Bear in mind these dead….An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in 
Ireland, (Belfast, Beyond the Pale Publications: 2001).  http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/ 
[Accessed 25 September 2004]. 
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Election Number of Votes 
1982 Assembly 63945.12 
1983 Westminster 102499.95 
1984 European 91147.161 
1985 Local government 75475.396 
1986 Westminster By-elections 38609.208 
1987 Westminster 83237.328 
1989 Local government 69744.617 
1989 European 49202.612 
1992 Westminster 78509.3 
1993 Local government 78638.25 
1994 European 55426.833 
1996 Forum 115520.88 
1997 Westminster 127332.324




2001 Local Government 163544.076
2003 Assembly 162626.58 
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